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Chinese Sex Spy Targeted Democrat Politicians, Raised Money For Eric Swalwell, Planted Intern In His Office, ‘Using Sexual Relationships’

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A Chinese spy operating in the Bay Area during the Obama administration  got so close to Rep. Eric Swalwell (D-CA) that the FBI had to intervene and provide him with a defensive briefing.

The Chinese spy bundled campaign contributions for California Rep. Eric Swalwell and planted an intern in the Democrat’s congressional office, according to a new report.

“Campaign fundraising, extensive networking, personal charisma, and romantic or sexual relationships.”

Eric Swalwell must step down from House Intel until we find out what kind of blackmail material the Chinese communists have on him.

As do the the other corrupt, compromised Democrats.

Related: China Launches Influence Campaign ‘On Steroids’ Targeting Biden Team, Those Around Them: Top U.S. Official

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Why it matters: The alleged operation offers a rare window into how Beijing has tried to gain access to and influence U.S. political circles.

  • While this suspected operative’s activities appear to have ended during the Obama administration, concerns about Beijing’s influence operations have spanned President Trump’s time in office and will continue to be a core focus for U.S. counterintelligence during the Biden administration.
Clockwise from top left: Fang with then-Dublin City Councilmember Eric Swalwell at an October 2012 student event; undated photo of Fang, now former Fremont Mayor Bill Harrison and Rep. Judy Chu; Fang with then-Rep. Mike Honda and then-San Jose city Councilmember Ash Kalra at a March 2014 event at the Chinese Embassy in D.C. Sources: Renren, Facebook, Facebook

The woman at the center of the operation, a Chinese national named Fang Fang or Christine Fang, targeted up-and-coming local politicians in the Bay Area and across the country who had the potential to make it big on the national stage.

  • Through campaign fundraising, extensive networking, personal charisma, and romantic or sexual relationships with at least two Midwestern mayors, Fang was able to gain proximity to political power, according to current and former U.S. intelligence officials and one former elected official.
  • Even though U.S. officials do not believe Fang received or passed on classified information, the case “was a big deal, because there were some really, really sensitive people that were caught up” in the intelligence network, a current senior U.S. intelligence official said.
  • Private but unclassified information about government officials — such as their habits, preferences, schedules, social networks, and even rumors about them — is a form of political intelligence. Collecting such information is a key part of what foreign intelligence agencies do.

Among the most significant targets of Fang’s efforts was Rep. Eric Swalwell (D-Calif.).

  • Fang took part in fundraising activity for Swalwell’s 2014 re-election campaign, according to a Bay Area political operative and a current U.S. intelligence official. Swalwell’s office was directly aware of these activities on its behalf, the political operative said. That same political operative, who witnessed Fang fundraising on Swalwell’s behalf, found no evidence of illegal contributions.
  • Federal Election Commission records don’t indicate Fang herself made donations, which are prohibited from foreign nationals.
  • Fang helped place at least one intern in Swalwell’s office, according to those same two people, and interacted with Swalwell at multiple events over the course of several years.

A statement from Swalwell’s office provided to Axios said: “Rep. Swalwell, long ago, provided information about this person — whom he met more than eight years ago, and whom he hasn’t seen in nearly six years — to the FBI. To protect information that might be classified, he will not participate in your story.”

What happened: Amid a widening counterintelligence probe, federal investigators became so alarmed by Fang’s behavior and activities that around 2015 they alerted Swalwell to their concerns — giving him what is known as a defensive briefing.

  • Swalwell immediately cut off all ties to Fang, according to a current U.S. intelligence official, and he has not been accused of any wrongdoing.
  • Fang left the country unexpectedly in mid-2015 amid the investigation. She did not respond to multiple attempts by Axios to reach her by email and Facebook.

Between the lines: The case demonstrates China’s strategy of cultivating relationships that may take years or even decades to bear fruit. The Chinese Communist Party knows that today’s mayors and city council members are tomorrow’s governors and members of Congress.

  • In the years since the Fang probe, the FBI has prioritized investigations into Chinese influence operations, creating a unit in May 2019 within the bureau solely dedicated to countering Beijing’s activities at the state and local levels. U.S. national security officials believe the threat posed by China has only grown with time.
  • “She was just one of lots of agents,” said a current senior U.S. intelligence official.
  • Beijing “is engaged in a highly sophisticated malign foreign influence campaign,” FBI director Chris Wray said in a July 2020 speech. These efforts involve “subversive, undeclared, criminal, or coercive attempts to sway our government’s policies, distort our country’s public discourse, and undermine confidence in our democratic processes and values,” Wray said.

The FBI declined to comment. The Chinese Embassy in Washington did not respond to a request for comment.

Details: Axios spoke with four current and former U.S. intelligence officials about the case over a period of more than a year. They requested anonymity because they were not authorized to speak to the media about the case.

  • Axios also spoke with 22 current and former elected officials, political operatives, and former students who knew Fang personally when she was based in the United States.
The cover: How Fang worked

Fang’s friends and acquaintances said she was in her late 20s or early 30s when she was based in the U.S. and was enrolled as a student at a Bay Area university.

She used political gatherings, civic society conferences, campaign rallies, and campus events to connect with elected officials and other prominent figures, according to U.S. intelligence officials, Bay Area political operatives, former students, and current and former elected officials who knew her.

  • U.S. intelligence officials believed she was overseeing likely unwitting subagents whom she helped place in local political and congressional offices.
  • Fang attended regional conferences for U.S. mayors, which allowed her to grow her network of politicians across the country.
  • She also engaged in sexual or romantic relationships with at least two mayors of Midwestern cities over a period of about three years, according to one U.S. intelligence official and one former elected official.
  • At least two separate sexual interactions with elected officials, including one of these Midwestern mayors, were caught on FBI electronic surveillance of Fang, according to two intelligence officials. Axios was unable to identify or speak to the elected officials.

Between 2011 and 2015, Fang’s activities brought her into contact with many of the Bay Area’s most prominent politicos.

  • She volunteered for Ro Khanna’s unsuccessful 2014 House bid, according to a former campus organizer and social media posts. (Khanna, a Democrat, was elected to the House in 2016.) Khanna’s office said he remembers seeing Fang at several Indian American political gatherings but did not have further contact with her. Khanna’s office said the FBI did not brief him on her activities. Khanna’s 2014 campaign staff said that Fang’s name does not appear in their staff records, though they said that their records do not include all volunteers.
Flyer for fundraiser for Rep. Tulsi Gabbard. Source: Facebook
  • Fang helped with a fundraiser for Rep. Tulsi Gabbard (D-Hawaii) in 2013, according to a flyer from the event Fang shared on Facebook. She appeared in photos over multiple years with a host of California politicians, including Khanna, Swalwell, Rep. Judy Chu (D-Calif.) and then-Rep. Mike Honda (D-Calif.).
  • Gabbard “has no recollection of ever meeting or talking with her, nor any recollection of her playing a major role at the fundraiser,” a spokesperson said in an email to Axios.
  • Fremont City Councilmember Raj Salwan, whose name appears on the flyer, told Axios he was unaware of Fang’s role in the event and her name was added to the flyer by other Asian American leaders.
  • Chu’s office said they have no records of Christine Fang. Honda said he had no memory of meeting Fang.
From left: Fang with Fremont City Councilmember Raj Salwan (L) and then-U.S. House candidate Ro Khanna at a September 2013 fundraiser for Rep. Tulsi Gabbard; Fang helped organize a 2012 town hall for Rep. Judy Chu. Sources: Facebook

The bottom line: U.S. officials believe Fang’s real reason for being in the U.S was to gather political intelligence and to influence rising U.S. officials on China-related issues.

  • Close relationships between a U.S. elected official and a covert Chinese intelligence operative can provide the Chinese government with opportunities to sway the opinion of key decision-makers.
  • Beijing may aim to influence foreign policy issues directly related to China, or issues closer to home, such as partnering with Chinese companies for local investment — an issue particularly salient among local-level officials such as mayors and city council members.
Sounding the alarm: The U.S. response

U.S. counterintelligence officials said they believe Fang acted at the direction of China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS), the country’s main civilian spy agency.

  • U.S. officials first noticed Fang through surveillance they were conducting on a different person — a suspected MSS officer working undercover as a diplomat in the San Francisco consulate, a current U.S. counterintelligence official said.
  • The suspected officer used the consulate as a base to do outreach to state and local-level U.S. politicians, including inviting them on trips to China, the official said.
  • The official added that both Fang and the suspected officer were focused on gathering political intelligence and conducting influence operations in the Bay Area. (Axios corroborated through U.S. State Department records that a Chinese diplomat with the same name as the suspected MSS officer was stationed in San Francisco during the period Fang was there.)
  • Fang and the suspected officer met or spoke on numerous occasions, leading U.S. officials to look into Fang’s own background and activities, the official said.
  • However, Fang’s main intelligence handlers were believed to be based in China, according to two U.S. officials.

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